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SCHOOL DISCIPLINE OF CYBER-BULLIES:
A PROPOSED THRESHOLD THAT
RESPECTS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
LAURA PAVLIK RAATJES*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Julia's classmates teased and bullied her for much of her time
at Central High School.' Three Central students posted a parody
Facebook profile of Julia that describes her in a derogatory
manner.2 The page is private, limited to the view of the three
bullies and those other students invited to view it. The bullies do
not bother Julia when she is at school; instead, they purposely
ignore her. Julia, who was shown the page by a friend, does not
know how many others have viewed it. Not knowing what to do,
Julia confides in her geography teacher Mr. Hill that she is having
trouble focusing at school as a result of the Facebook posts.

* The author received her J.D. in May 2011 from Chicago-Kent College of
Law.
1. Compare this hypothetical situation with the real-life harassment of
David Knight. Knight discovered a website some of his peers created, titled
"Welcome to the page that makes fun of Dave Knight." SHAHEEN SHARIFF,
CYBER-BULLYING: ISSUES AND SOLUTIONS FOR THE SCHOOL, THE CLASSROOM
AND THE HOME 31 (Routledge 2008). According to Knight, the website included
"pages of hateful comments directed at [him] and everyone in [his] family."
Joan Leishman, Cyber-bullying, CBC.CA (Oct. 10, 2002), http://www.cbc.cal
newsfbackground/bullying/cyberbullying.htm. Students also sent Knight
numerous derogatory emails, including one stating, "You're gay, don't ever
talk again . . . ." Id. Unable to withstand the endless onslaught of bullying,
Knight withdrew from high school and finished out his last year from home.
Id.
2. Lauren Newby's story provides an example of what some anonymous
posters are writing about their classmates online. Newby was relentlessly
bullied by anonymous blog posters on a website created by a former student of
her high school. Amy Benfer, Cyber Slammed, SALON.COM (July 3, 2001, 2:03
PM), http://dir.salon.com/mwt/feature/2001/07/03/cyber-bullies/index.html?sid
=1039555. Posters left messages such as, "[P]eople don't like you because you
are a suicidal cow who can't stop eating," and, "I guess I'll have to wait until
you kill yourself which I hope is not long from now." Id. Moreover, there was a
whole page consisting of the phrase "Die bitch queen!" repeated hundreds of
times. Id. Newby's car was also egged and acid was thrown at her front door,
which injured her mother. Id. The culprits were not determined. Id. See also
JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, BORN DIGITAL: UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST
GENERATION OF DIGITAL NATIVES 93 (2008) (detailing the bullying that

Lauren Newby suffered at the hands of her classmates).
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Despite these attacks, Julia still attends school and maintains A's
and B's in her classes. Nonetheless, Mr. Hill observes that Julia's
grades have been slightly lower the past few months, which
coincides with the time period of the bullies' attacks.
Mr. Hill desires to discipline the bullies for their harmful
behavior. He is also concerned about Julia's emotional health, in
particular, because he has heard about cases of cyber-bullying that
have pushed young people to suicide. 3 In doing some of his own
cyber-investigations, Mr. Hill searches one bully's name on
Facebook and finds that she is the creator of a page titled, "Mr.
Hill is the worst teacher I've ever met!"4 Mr. Hill is unable to
access the private page, but if he could, he would see that it has
thirty-five members and is devoted to sharing negative feelings
about him. Mr. Hill is not sure what to do next. Can he discipline
the alleged bullies? Should he talk to their parents or the
administration? Should he investigate whether Facebook can
remove the pages about Julia and himself? Should he call the
police?
3. One such case of extreme bullying is detailed in court documents filed
by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, which exposed a group of high school
students' campaign to bully and systematically demoralize their classmate,
Phoebe Prince. Commonwealth's Memorandum of Law in Support of its
Motion for Joinder of Youthful Offender Indictment and Delinquency
Complaints Pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. Pro. 9(a)(3) and G.L. C. 119, Section
54 at 3-9, Commonwealth v. Longe, No. YO10H001 (Apr. 8, 2010), available at
http://www.myfoxboston.com/generic/news/Ashley-Longe-Part-I. Among many
other abusive efforts, the accused bullies authored several Facebook postings
that explicitly derogated her, made threats at school to harm her, and called
her offensive names, such as "stupid slut" and "Irish whore." Id. at 6-7. Unable
to live any longer with the unrelenting abuse of her classmates, Prince
committed suicide. Documents: Bullied Teen Phoebe Prince Sought Help from
http://www.
2010),
9,
(Apr.
BOSTON
FOX
MY
School,
myfoxboston.com/dpp/news/local/documents-bullied-teen-phoebe-prince-sought
-help-from-school-25apx-20100409#. The students involved now face a number
of criminal charges and school sanctions. Id. See also Sam Dolnick, 2 Linked to
Suicide Case Withdraw from Rutgers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2010, http://www.
nytimes.com/2010/10/30/nyregion/30rutgers.html?ref=mollywei (covering the
story of Rutgers freshman, Tyler Clementi, who committed suicide after two
other freshmen secretly videotaped him kissing another boy and then
uploaded the video to the internet).
4. This fact is taken from the case Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365,
1367 (S.D. Fla. 2010). There, Katherine Evans was suspended from school for
creating a Facebook group titled "Ms. Sarah Phelps is the worst teacher I've
ever met!" Id. The group was devoted to sharing negative feelings about the
teacher. Id. According to the Southern District of Florida, the teacher "never
saw the posting and it did not disrupt school activities." Id. The Court held
that the Facebook post was protected off-campus speech. Id. at 1374. The
school ultimately settled by removing the suspension from Evans's record, and
paying Evans $1 in nominal damages and $15,000 in attorney's fees. Jessica
Sick, Student Wins $1 in Free Speech Facebook Settlement, NBC MIAMI (Dec.
28, 2010, 10:00 AM), http://www.nbcmiami.comlnews/local-beat/Student-Wins1-in-lst-Amendment-Facebook-Settlement-112546934.html.
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Unfortunately, Julia and Mr. Hill's hypothetical situation has
become an all-too-common concern piled upon teachers' alreadyfull plates. As evidenced by this hypothetical-formed by
combining facts from a number of recent bullying incidents-there
are many common threads running through cyber-bullying
situations. In most cases, the bullies are students at the same
school attended by the victim-often a student, faculty member, or
administrator. In many cases, the bullies take advantage of the
perceived anonymity of the Internet to humiliate their victims,
and in many cases, this bullying emotionally harms the victims.
Moreover, young victims are not likely to have fully developed
coping mechanisms to handle the stress of being bullied. Cyberbullying will likely upset even those victims who are more
resilient. Yet the cases where young victims experience lifetime
injuries-which affect them emotionally, physically, and
educationally-often go unnoticed until it is too late to reverse the
damage done. The current widespread concern over cyber-bullying
is warranted in light of the tragic, sometimes even fatal effects it
can have on the victims.
But several of the recently litigated cases involve student
5
bullies who are partaking in purely off-campus speech. Such cases
are perhaps best dealt with through proactive measures other
than school discipline. 6 Although this victimization can certainly
be emotionally harrowing for those targeted, this type of cyber7
bullying is not likely to result in substantial disruption to school
5. See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., No. 07-4465,
2011 WL 2305970, at *7 (3d Cir. June 13, 2011):
It would be an unseemly and dangerous precedent to allow the state, in
the guise of school authorities, to reach into a child's home and control
his/her actions there to the same extent that it can control that child
when he/she participates in school sponsored activities. Allowing the
District to punish Justin for conduct he engaged in while at his
grandmother's house using his grandmother's computer would create
just such a precedent, and we therefore conclude that the district court
correctly ruled that the District's response to Justin's expressive
conduct violated the First Amendment guarantee of free expression.
See also J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 920 (3d
Cir. 2011) [hereinafter Snyder] (explaining that the student's creation of the
profile at home coupled with the lack of any substantial disruption barred
school officials from disciplining her).
6. LISA MADIGAN, CYBERBULLYING: A STUDENT PERSPECTIVE 4 (2010),
available at http://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/children/cyberbullying-focus-rep
ort061O.pdf ("[M]any students thought that suspension or direct punitive
consequences [were] not sustainable solutions to cyberbullying." Instead,
students "preferred mediation and felt that they have the ability to work
through these issues if given a safe environment.").
7. See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503 (1969) (coining the phrase "substantial disruption" as part of a test
criterion for determining whether a student's First Amendment speech rights
have been infringed upon by a public actor).
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operations aside from that associated with investigating and
punishing the perpetrators.8 Since a substantial disruption may
not be present in the facts, a court may focus on the public nature
of the Internet in bolstering a forecast of substantial disruption,
even when only a limited number of individuals view the content.9
Nonetheless, educators and administrators desire to respond
constructively to cyber-bullying behavior while recognizing
competing concerns for maintaining authority over students and
preserving their important constitutional rights.
This Article proposes that school discipline for entirely offcampus cyber-bullying should only be permitted subject to a high
standard, which requires that the speech actually cause a
substantial disruption of school operations, rather than the more
deferential alternative of a forecast of substantial disruption,
which is the current standard used for discipline of on-campus
speech. For instance, while a victim's excessive absences from
school may be enough to find a substantial disruption, the fact
that the cyber-bullying was done in a public or lewd manner would
not be a sufficient basis for school discipline.
Part II provides background information on cyber-bullying
and describes the legal frameworks currently in use for evaluating
when schools may discipline students for their on- and off-campus
speech. Part III explains why the traditional Tinker substantial
disruption test as applied to off-campus cyber-bullying speech may
run afoul of constitutional free speech rights. Part IV sets forth a
modified version of the Tinker test to apply to entirely off-campus
cyber-bullying. This Part also returns to Julia and Mr. Hill to
examine the practical result of such a test along with alternative,
and perhaps more effective, avenues for addressing their
problems.
8. See, e.g., Snyder, 650 F.3d at 920 (holding that a humiliating MySpace
profile created off-campus of the school principal "could not 'reasonably have
led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material
interference with school activities') (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514; see also
Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 51-52 (2d Cir. 2008)(stating that the court
relied primarily on three facts in determining a substantial disruption was
foreseeable: 1) the language used was not "conducive to cooperative conflict
resolution," 2) the information posted was "misleading," and 3) the discipline
related to the student's participation in an extracurricular activity). Not only
do these facts seem to forecast at most a minor disruption, but taken together,
they could likely describe any number of student rants that no doubt occur on
a frequent basis away from public school campuses.
9. See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286,
300-01 (3d Cir. 2010), rev'd en banc, 2011 WL 2305973 (3d Cir. 2011)
[hereinafter J.S.] ("[D]ue to the technological advances of the Internet, J.S.
and K.L. created a profile that could be, and in fact was, viewed by at least
twenty-two members of the Middle School community within a matter of
days."). The court then went on to infer that many members of the community
would have eventually read and been upset by the content. Id.
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CYBER-BULLYING AND THE CURRENT SCOPE OF SCHOOL
DISCIPLINE FOR STUDENT SPEECH

A. Cyber-bullying: An Overview
Cyber-bullying occurs "when teens use the Internet, cell
phones, or other devices to send or post text or images intended to
hurt or embarrass another person."10 The most common form of
cyber-bullying is harmful, but not criminal, involving behavior like
"persistent taunts and insults and verbal aggression . .. "11
Because cyber-bullying occurs via electronic means, it is
distinguishable from traditional bullying that involves actions
such as "hitting or punching . .. name-calling or teasing . .. or

intimidation through gestures or social exclusion."1 2 Other
important differences between cyber-bullying and traditional
bullying are that cyber-bullying can occur on a nonstop basis, can
be distributed to a public audience rapidly, and can be committed
anonymously.13 The public audience aspect is particularly
important given that a study conducted by the Illinois Attorney
General found that "the broad exposure [of cyber-bullying can]
mov[e] the situation from a single mean comment to a mob
bullying incident."14
Another recent study found that while victims and
perpetrators of traditional bullying report similar levels of
depression, victims of cyber-bullying report significantly higher
levels of depression than the cyber-bullies themselves) 5 The
researchers noted that unlike traditional bullying, which usually
involves a face-to-face confrontation, cyber victims might not see
or identify their harassers.16 "[A]s such, cyber victims may be more
likely to feel isolated, dehumanized, or helpless at the time of the
attack." 7 Although studies on the prevalence of cyber-bullying
have produced varying statistics, 8 one may simply look to recent
headlines to understand the emotional torment caused by this
antisocial behavior. Moreover, more subtle effects are frequently
10. Cyberbullying, NCPC, http://www.ncpc.org/newsroom/current-campaig
ns/cyberbullying (last visited Oct. 7, 2011).
11. Mary Sue Backus, 0MG! Missing the Teachable Moment and
Undermining the Future of the First Amendment - TISNF!, 60 CASE W. RES.
L. REv. 153, 188 (2009).
12. Guidance on Bullying and Cyberbullying Prevention,NYSED.GOV, http:
//www.pl2.nysed.gov/technology/internet safety/documents/cyberbullying.pdf
(last updated Mar. 15, 2011).
13. Backus, supra note 11, at 158-59.
14. Madigan, supra note 6, at 6.
15. Jing Wang et al., Cyber and Traditional Bullying: Differential
Association with Depression, 48 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 415, 416-17 (2011).
16. Id. at 417.
17. Id.

18. Id. at 416-17.
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experienced by the victims, such as "discomfort [and] selfconsciousness" that can "impact [their] daily li[ves]."19
B. Current Paradigmsfor School DisciplineAuthority
A school's authority to discipline students for speech uttered
off-campus, outside of school hours, is highly problematic because
it may infringe on a number of constitutional rights. At the same
time, remaining hands-off makes educators uneasy in light of the
perceived prevalence of, and significant emotional harm caused by,
cyber-bullying. To determine where cyber-bullying falls in the
school discipline continuum, it is helpful to first consider the
current paradigms for school discipline authority.
1. Title IX
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 requires that,
"[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . ."20
Under this rule, schools can be "held liable . .. where they are

deliberately indifferent to sexual harassment, of which they have
actual knowledge, that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively
offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to the
educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school." 21
Title IX is not likely an appropriate remedy for cyber-bullying due
to its narrow scope. It directs that schools be able to exercise some
sort of control over whether or not the actions actually occur; such
is not the case with off-campus cyber-bullying. Moreover, Title IX
applies only to sexual harassment, which-while many cases of
cyber-bullying would likely fall under this category to some degree
or another-does not encompass all instances of cyber-bullying.
At the same time though, the law is currently unclear as to
whether a school may be held liable under Title IX if it knows
about student-on-student or teacher-on-student off-campus sexual
harassment and does not take steps to prevent it. As one
commentator who supports liability in such a scenario has noted,
the reasoning courts have used to uphold school discipline for
cyber-bullying can be applied to liability for Title IX.22 In other
words, if a plaintiff can show that "a sufficient 'nexus' exists
between the student's off-campus cyberspeech and the school ....

19. Madigan, supra note 6, at 4.
20. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006).
21. Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629,
650 (1999).
22. Kathleen Conn, Commentary, Sexting and Teen Suicides: Will School
AdministratorsBe Responsible?, 261 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 15 (2010).
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[or] if school administrators reasonably believe that the message
will reach school and create a substantial disruption," then
liability for Title IX can be imposed. 23 Yet, this basis for liability is
inappropriate for the same reasons as is this basis for upholding
school discipline for cyber-bullying, as explained below.
2. On-Campus Speech
Another source of school authority comes from Supreme Court
case law that finds schools may, in certain defined circumstances,
discipline students for disruptive on-campus or school-sponsored
speech. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District,24 school officials suspended students for wearing black
armbands to school in silent protest of the Vietnam War.25 There,
the Court held that school officials violated the students' First
Amendment right to free speech, stating that in order for a school
to "justify prohibition" of students' speech, the expression must
substantially disrupt the operation of the school or there must be a
"reason to anticipate" that the expression "would materially and
substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate
discipline in the operation of the school." 26 The Court also
explained that schools could punish students for expressions that
"collid[e] with the rights of others."27
Since the Court's decision in Tinker, it has set forth a number
of exceptions to the framework. The first exception is for lewd
speech, set forth in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser.28 In
Fraser, school officials suspended a student for three days for
delivering a lewd and obscene school election speech. 29 There, the
Supreme Court held that the school acted within its authority
since the speech "undermine[d] the school's basic educational
mission" and was "unrelated to any political viewpoint."so
Later, the Court set forth a second exception for schoolsponsored speech in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,31
where school officials removed two articles discussing students'
experiences with pregnancy and divorce from the school-sponsored
newspaper due to concerns that the students' privacy would be
invaded and that the material was inappropriate for younger
readers. 32 There, the Court upheld the school's actions, holding

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503.
Id. at 504.
Id. at 509.
Id. at 513.
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 676 (1986).
Id. at 677-78.
Id. at 685.
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
Id. at 263-64.
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that school officials may edit school-sponsored student speech "so
long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns."33
The most recent exception to Tinker is for speech advocating
illegal drug use. In Morse v. Frederick,34 school officials suspended
a student for ten days for unfurling a banner that stated "B[ong]
H[its] 4 J[esus]" at an off-campus, school-approved activity.3 The
Court held that school officials may discipline students for speech
at a school-sponsored event that can be reasonably interpreted as
advocating illegal drug use.36
As a result of this case law, lower courts have adopted a
universal approach of applying Tinker to schools' discipline of
bullies (or other disruptive speakers) whose behaviors occur oncampus, during school hours. Such an approach usually involves
high judicial deference to school authorities. For instance, in
Smith ex rel. Smith v. Mount Pleasant Public Schools,3 7 Smith, a
student at Mount Pleasant High School, read aloud a written
statement during lunchtime to other students criticizing, among
other things, the high school's principal and the school's tardy
policy. 38 Specifically, Smith referred to the principal "as a 'skank'
and 'tramp' to whom people did not want to talk." 39 There, the
court applied the traditional Tinker analysis and held that the
school's eight-day suspension did not violate Smith's free speech
rights because his speech caused a substantial disruption by
upsetting students who heard it and by undermining the authority
of the principal. 40
3. Off-Campus Speech
How the lower courts have dealt with schools' attempts to
discipline students for off-campus bullying or speech-although a
less-established area of law-is directly applicable to the issue of
cyber-bullying. The majority of courts found in such cases that
schools may discipline for off-campus behavior that causes or may
reasonably be anticipated to cause a substantial or material
disruption of the school operations.41 In other words, courts tend to
33. Id. at 273.
34. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
35. Id. at 397-98.
36. Id. at 410.
37. Smith ex rel. Smith v. Mount Pleasant Pub. Schs., 285 F. Supp. 2d 987
(E.D. Mich. 2003).
38. Id. at 989.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 997.
41. See, e.g., O'Rourke v. Walker, 128 A. 25 (Conn. 1925); Baker v. Downey
City Bd. of Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517 (D.C. Cal. 1969) (providing deference to
school authorities, in instances of students' off-campus behavior that may
reasonably lead to substantial disruption).
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apply a Tinker-like approach to such behavior.
For example-although far predating Tinker-in O'Rourke v.
Walker,42 the school punished its student for bullying other
students from his parents' house after school hours while the other
students were walking home from school.4 3 The court upheld the
discipline, explaining that school authorities, in order to maintain
good order in the school and to promote the welfare and efficiency
of the school, are the only people who can effectively discipline acts
of this nature, since public authorities find it "too trifling," and
parents do not pay attention to it.44
More recently, in the 1969 case Baker v. Downey City Board
of Education,45 two high school students were suspended for ten
days for creating a newspaper-outside of school hours and off
school premises-and distributing it nearby, but off school
property. 46 There, the court-in a show of great deferenceof the
characterization
emphasized the administration's
newspaper as displaying a "negative attitude," and as "failfing] to
be constructive in [its] criticism of the administration." 47 The court
thus held that the administration was within its authority in
regulating the speech.48 The court also stated that being off of
school premises was not a concern since the distribution occurred
while students were on their way to school. 49 Several other lower
courts have held that school authorities may discipline students
for off-campus behavior or expression that causes or reasonably
may cause a substantial disruption of the school environment.50
On the other hand, some courts have held that schools cannot
discipline students for off-campus speech that does not actually
cause a disruption. For example, in Shanley v. Northeast

42. O'Rourke, 128 A. at 25.
43. Id. at 26.
44. Id. at 26-27.
45. Baker, 307 F. Supp. at 517.
46. Id. at 519.
47. Id. at 526.
48. Id. at 527-28.
49. Id. at 526.
50. See, e.g., Nicholas B. v. Sch. Comm. of Worcester, 587 N.E.2d 211, 213
(Mass. 1992) (holding that school had authority to discipline student for
assaulting another student off school grounds where assault was planned
while at school and occurred while students were walking home from school);
R.R. v. Bd. of Educ. of Shore Reg'l High Sch. Dist., 263 A.2d 180, 184 (N.J.
Super. 1970) (holding that student could be suspended after a preliminary
hearing if school officials had reasonable cause to feel that student was a
danger to himself, others, or school property). There, the court explained,
"school authorities have .. . a right [to discipline students] . . . where such is

reasonably necessary for the student's physical or emotional safety and wellbeing, or for reasons relating to the safety and well-being of other students,
teachers or public school property." Id.
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5 1 five students at MacArthur High
Independent School District,
School created a newspaper outside of school premises and school
hours, and distributed it "near but outside the school premises"
before and after school hours. 52 Many copies of the newspapers
ultimately made their way to the school.58 As a result of this
unauthorized activity, the school suspended the students for three
days. 54
The court described the paper as polite and inoffensive, and
rejected the "school board's bootstrap transmogrification into
Super-Parent," holding that the school improperly disciplined the
students for speech that did not reasonably forecast or create a
substantial disruption of the school environment.55 Although the
court did not rule on whether a school may regulate off-campus
student speech, it stated in dicta that:

[I]t is not at all unusual to allow the geographical location of the
actor to determine the constitutional protection that should be
afforded to his or her acts. For example . . . "fire" might be
constitutionally yelled on the street corner, but not within the
theater; or a march down the middle of a street might be protected
activity, while a march down the hallway of a building might not. By
the same token, it is not at all unusual in our system that different
authorities have responsibility only for their own bailiwicks. An
offense against one authority that is perpetrated within the
jurisdiction of another authority is usually punishable only by the
authority in whose jurisdiction the offense took place. Thus . . . the
width of a street might very well determine the breadth of the school
board's authority. Students, as any other citizens, are subject to the
civil and criminal laws of the community, state, and nation. A
student acting entirely outside school property is potentially subject
to the laws of disturbing the peace, inciting to riot, littering, and so
forth, whether or not he is potentially subject to a school regulation
that the school board wishes to extend to off-campus activity.56
This explanation is instructive for determining where to set a
limit on school authority. Although there are circumstances where
disruptive behavior away from school spills over into the school's
operations, this opinion indicates that where the behavior is
separate from the school in both time and place, the school is not
the appropriate disciplinary authority.
In a more recent case, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
likewise indicated that schools may only discipline students for
conduct that occurs on campus while school or other functions are

51. Shanley v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972).
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 964.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 966-67.
Id. at 974.
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in session.57 There, a student smoked marijuana on the school
playground outside of school hours.58 After purchasing the
marijuana from another student, the student in question then
used the drugs with two other schoolmates.5 9 Nonetheless, the
court held there was an insufficient nexus with school operations
because there was no evidence the planning or drug exchange
occurred at school during school hours. 0 There, the court
explained that in order for a school to discipline its students, "said
students must be in the district's charge at school functions."5 ' The
court further explained that a school's position of acting in loco
parentis only "provides for such control as is necessary to prevent
infractions of discipline and interference with the educational
process." 62
Finally, at least one court has described a possible exception
from discipline where the off-campus student did not intend for
the speech to reach campus. For instance, the Central District of
California noted that where the student "clearly did not intend the
speech to reach campus . . . the student speech precedents likely

should not apply. In these . .. scenarios, school officials have no
authority, beyond the general principles governing speech in a
public arena, to regulate such speech."68
This intent standard-while appealing at first-is not likely
an appropriate answer for schools to use to discipline cyber-bullies
for several reasons. In particular, it may be difficult to discern
whether an online post was intended to reach campus. Typically, a
bully intends for his or her actions to be noticed by the target,
usually a member of the school community. Therefore, if the
standard was to whom the bully intended to aim the speech, then
schools would likely have free rein to discipline all cyber-bullies,
regardless of whether their speech disrupted school operations. 64

57. D.O.F. v. Lewisburg Area Sch. Dist. Bd. of Sch. Dir., 868 A.2d 28, 36
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004).
58. Id. at 32.
59. Id. at 35.
60. Id. at 36.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d
1094, 1107 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
64. Cf. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 933 (noting that if the Supreme Court's Fraser
decision could be used to punish the students who created the private
MySpace profile at issue, then "two students can be punished for using a
vulgar remark to speak about their teacher at a private party, if another
student overhears the remark, reports it to the school authorities, and the
school authorities find the remark 'offensive."').
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COURTS' ATTEMPTS TO TACKLE OFF-CAMPUS CYBER-BULLYING
AND WHY TINKER JUST IS NOT ENOUGH

The case law on when schools may discipline students for offcampus behavior is far from clearly defined. Moreover, the cases
described above all involve non-Internet behavior: drug use, inperson bullying, and underground newspaper-making. Those
cases, therefore, did not have to address the additional concern of
widespread publicity that occurs with the click of a mouse. In the
recent past, courts have begun to tackle the cyber-bullying issue
with mixed results.
A. The GeographicApproach
One view courts have taken as to when schools may discipline
students for off-campus cyber-bullying has been coined the
"geographic" approach.65 Under this approach, no Tinker analysis
is conducted for off-campus speech-schools simply cannot
discipline the students. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage
School District66 provides an example of this approach. Justin
Layshock, a student at Hickory High School, created an offensive
parody MySpace profile of the school principal while at his
grandmother's house outside of school hours.67 The school district's
discipline of Justin consisted of a ten-day suspension, placement in
an alternative education program, and banning from all extracurricular activities and his graduation ceremony.68 There, the
Third Circuit rejected the school district's claim that Justin had
entered school district property by copying a picture of the school
principal from the school website and pasting it into the parody
MySpace profile.6 9 The court thus held that the school's discipline
violated Justin's First Amendment right of free speech because
there was an insufficient nexus between Justin's expression and
the school.7 0 The court focused largely on the geographic location of
the speech, noting that schools should not be permitted to "reach
into a child's home and control his/her actions there . ...
65. The geographic approach limits a school's authority to punish behavior
outside the school boundaries. This approach, although widely discussed, is
often rejected in favor of the "forecast approach." See, e.g., J.C., 711 F. Supp.
2d at 1104 ("The substantial weight of authority indicates that geographic
boundaries generally carry little weight in the student-speech analysis."). For
explanation of the latter approach, see infra Part III.B.
66. Layshock, 593 F.3d at 249.
67. Id. at 252.
68. Id. at 254.
69. Id. at 263.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 260. Other courts have considered the geographic origin of the
cyber-bullying an issue. See generally Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of the
Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007) (discussing, briefly,
concern over off-campus online speech, but holding that speech could be
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B. The ForecastApproach
Another approach can be described as the "forecast" approach.
This approach directly applies Tinker to off-campus speech and
permits discipline of the students where the school could
72
reasonably forecast a substantial disruption of school operations.
73
In Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools, Kowalski, a senior at
Musselman High School, created an offensive MySpace profile
about a fellow student while at her parent's house outside of school
hours. 74 The school district's discipline of Kowalski consisted of a
75
five-day school suspension and a ninety-day social suspension.
There, the Fourth Circuit held that "the School District was
authorized by Tinker to discipline Kowalski, regardless of where
her speech originated, because the speech was materially and
substantially disruptive . . . ."
The Fourth Circuit thus jumped right into the Tinker analysis
and found that a substantial disruption had occurred at the school
for three reasons: (1) the targeted classmate was absent from a
day of class as a result of the post; (2) Kowalski directed the post
to students at her school; and (3) Kowalski could anticipate the
targeted student as understanding "the attack as having been
made in the school context."77 Thus, the court held the school's
discipline did not violate Kowalski's First Amendment right to free
expression.7 8
C. FirstAmendment Concerns
Whether courts apply the traditional Tinker test to offcampus cyber-bullying using the geographic or forecast approach,
disciplined because its violent nature reasonably forecast a disruption); J.S. v.
Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002) [hereinafter Bethlehem]
(stating that the first step of the analysis is to consider the location of the
speech, but then holding that there was a sufficient nexus where the website
was viewed at the school). Note that in this geographic analysis courts may
conflate the issues of geographic origin and disruption of the school
environment, as in Wisniewski, or may establish an attenuated nexus that will
virtually always be found, as in Bethlehem.
72. The "forecast" approach provides schools the authority to intervene in
scenarios where behavior, participated in off-campus, can reasonably be
believed to effectuate a substantial disruption on-campus, during school hours.
See J.C., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1101 ("School discipline is appropriate where the
facts reasonably lead school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or
material interference with school activities as a result of the student's
speech.").
73. Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Schs., No. 10-1098, 2011 WL 3132523, at *1
(4th Cir. July 27, 2011).
74. Id. at *1.
75. Id. at *3.
76. Id. at *7.
77. Id. at *8.
78. Id. at *9.
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there is a risk of schools overstepping the bounds of their authority
as well as the bounds of students' and parents' constitutional
rights. To begin with, when students are disciplined for off-campus
cyber-bullying, their First Amendment right to free expression
may be violated. Despite the poor taste and dubious morals of
many cyber-bullies, it is axiomatic that the public interest is
served by the unfettered dissemination of ideas.79
One of the central reasons for having a right to free speech is
to enable members of society to argue and disagree with one
another. In fact, as the Supreme Court has stated, free speech
"may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they
are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and
challenging."s0 Yet, politically provocative or challenging speech is
not the only utterance to receive protection. The First Amendment
also generally protects lewd and vulgar speech,8 ' and the Supreme
Court has repeatedly read the First Amendment to protect
offensive speech. 82
In part because of the lofty goals of the First Amendment, the
Supreme Court has only "'permitted restrictions upon the content
of speech in a few limited areas' and has never 'included a freedom
to disregard these traditional limitations."'8 3 Nonetheless, if a
cyber-bullying attack falls within one of these exceptions to First
Amendment protection, then the government can regulate it. Some
forms of restricted speech that may be applicable to cyber-bullying
include true threats, libel, and obscenity. In such cases, the speech
is unprotected, and the speaker is subject to criminal sanctions.
Yet, these restrictions are narrow, and the First Amendment does
79. See, e.g., Snyder, 650 F.3d at 939 ("[A]lthough speech like J.S.'s may
appear to be worthless, it does enable citizens to vent their frustrations in
nonviolent ways.. . . [and] [w]e ought not to discount the importance in our
society of such a 'safety valve."') (Smith, J., concurring).
80. Terminiello v. City of Chi., 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
81. See J.S., 593 F.3d at 317-18 (explaining that, "in Morse [the majority
emphasized that] '[h]ad Fraser delivered the same speech in a public forum
outside the school context, it would have been protected."'). The court also
noted that, "[t]he Supreme Court in Cohen held that a state may not make a
'single four-letter expletive a criminal offense."' Id. at 318. The court therefore
extrapolated that "a student's free speech rights outside the school context are
coextensive with the rights of an adult, such as Cohen." Id.
82. In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Supreme Court struck down Ohio's
criminal syndicalism statute, which barred advocating violent means of
political action. 395 U.S. 444, 445 (1969). There, the statute had been applied
to prosecute a Ku Klux Klan member who publicly, and on television, stated at
a Ku Klux Klan rally, that "there might have to be some revengeance taken"
for the suppression of white people, and that "the nigger should be returned to
Africa, the Jew returned to Israel." Id. at 446-47. This speech is clearly
harmful and frightening, but is protected nonetheless.
83. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010) (alteration in
original).

2011]

School Discipline of Cyber-Bullies

99

not unconditionally exclude harassing or intimidating speech. 84
Moreover, as noted by several courts, in situations where offcampus student speech raises such concerns, school officials are
best off seeking assistance from law enforcement or legal counsel.85
This is due, in large part, to the fact that school administrators
and faculty are generally ill-equipped to identify nuanced
distinctions between speech that is criminal and speech that is
merely offensive.88

Where the cyber-bullying does not invoke one of the limited
exceptions to the First Amendment, school administrators may
feel that they are still within their authority to punish students
because of the perception that students' free speech rights outside
of school are not co-extensive with adults' speech rights in public.
But this would be a contracted understanding of Supreme Court
precedent. Tinker admits only that students' free speech rights in
school are not co-extensive with adults' free speech rights in
public.87 Supreme Court opinions provide evidence that this lower
level of protection for students' free speech rights set forth in
Tinker and its progeny should be construed as limited solely to
speech that actually occurs at school-sanctioned events or on
school grounds.88

For instance, in Hazelwood, the Court stated that "[a] school
need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its 'basic
educational mission,' even though the government could not censor
similar speech outside the school."89 The implication here is that
schools, as governmental entities, cannot censor speech uttered
84. See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the DigitalAge, 60
FLA. L. REV. 1027, 1097 (2008) ("[The Supreme] Court has made clear that

individuals must tolerate speech that denigrates their racial or ethnic
background or religious beliefs if the expression falls short of incitement or
fighting words.").
85. E.g., Shanley v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 974 (5th Cir. 1972);
Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 (2d
Cir. 1979).
86. See Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1051 ("In addition to their vested interest and
susceptibility to community pressure, they are generally unversed in difficult
constitutional concepts such as libel and obscenity. Since superintendents and
principals may act arbitrarily, erratically, or unfairly, the chill on expression
is greatly exacerbated.") (internal citation omitted).
87. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513-14.
88. In Ginsberg v. State of New York, the Court upheld a statute prohibiting
the sale of obscene materials to minors, noting that "even where there is an
invasion of protected freedoms the power of the state to control the conduct of
children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults." 390 U.S. 629,
638 (1968) (internal quotations marks omitted). Nonetheless, the Court has
made a distinction between viewing obscenity and speaking freely in the case
of children. In Tinker, the majority opinion "assum[ed] that, school discipline
aside, the First Amendment rights of children are co-extensive with those of
adults." 393 U.S. at 514-15 (Stewart, J., concurring).
89. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266 (citing Fraser,478 U.S. at 685).
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outside of school simply because it undermines the educational
mission. Likewise, this statement also illustrates that young
people, like adults, have broad First Amendment protection away
from school. Similarly, in Fraser, the Court expressed grave
concern for the harmful psychological and emotional effects
Fraser's lewd speech could have had on the student and school
audience.90 The Court even asserted that, "such utterances are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality."9 1
Yet, just a few years ago, in Morse, the Court acknowledged
that "[h]ad Fraser delivered the same speech in a public forum
outside the school context, it would have been protected."9 2
Likewise, several federal courts have asserted in dicta that when
student speech is uttered outside of school, the applicable standard
is the one that traditionally governs First Amendment issues
arising in the community.93 Although there is limited case law on
the extent to which the free speech rights of children in public are
co-extensive with those of adults in public, these remarks
illustrate that children's First Amendment rights are, at the very
least, significantly broader outside of the school context.
If schools had free rein to discipline students for off-campus,
non-disruptive Internet postings that the school perceives as
undermining its educational mission, the potential chill on student
speech is evident. This chill of expression would be at its height if
schools' policing of cyber-bullies ultimately extended to policing
90. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683 ("The speech could well be seriously
damaging to its less mature audience, many of whom were only 14 years old
and on the threshold of awareness of human sexuality.").
91. Id. at 685 (internal citation omitted).
92. Morse, 551 U.S. at 405. See Snyder, 650 F.3d at 927 (emphasizing that
Fraserwas limited to regulating vulgar, lewd, and indecent speech in school.).
93. See, e.g., Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1050 ("Here, because school officials have
ventured out of the school yard and into the general community where the
freedom accorded expression is at its zenith, their actions must be evaluated
by the principles that bind government officials in the public arena.");
Shanley, 462 F.2d at 974 (noting "that it is not at all unusual to allow the
geographical location of the actor to determine the constitutional protection
that should be afforded to his or her acts."); Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch., 822
F.2d 747, 750 (8th Cir. 1988) ("The school district asserts no authority to
govern or punish what students say, write, or publish to each other or to the
public at any location outside the school buildings and grounds. If school
authorities were to claim such a power, quite different issues would be raised,
and the burden of the authorities to justify their policy under the First
Amendment would be much greater, perhaps even insurmountable."); Snyder,
650 F.3d at 936 (stating that Tinker does not apply to off-campus speech, "and
that the First Amendment protects students engaging in off-campus speech to
the same extent it protects speech by citizens in the community at
large.") (Smith, J., concurring).
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the Internet activity of students criticizing the acts of school
administrators or faculty, 94 or expressing themselves in a creative,
but misunderstood, format.95 Students who are punished for such
speech generally do not have comparable financial resources to
school districts when taking advantage of any procedural
safeguards available to them.9 6 Moreover, many students may not
realize they are able to challenge such a decision, and may be
deterred from expressing themselves on controversial subjects in
the future.97
D. ParentalRights Concerns

Likewise, permitting school officials to discipline students for
conduct in their homes presents some slippery slope concerns. For
instance, if schools may discipline for off-campus, non-disruptive
cyber-bullying, then they may assign Internet-trolling duties to a
disciplinary Dean to find new perpetrators. What other offensive
behaviors in the home might schools learn of and then discipline
their students for?
The Second Circuit has noted that, "it is conceivable that
school officials could consign a student to a segregated study hall
because he and a classmate watched an X-rated film on his living
room cable television."98 There, the court was explaining that
actions that occur in the home are "the proper subjects of parental
discipline," and that "the First Amendment forbids public school
administrators and teachers from regulating the material to which
a child is exposed after he leaves school each afternoon."9 9 This is
an accurate illustration of the limits on school authority to
discipline-reaching into the home may infringe upon the child's
First Amendment right to free expression and may likewise
infringe on the parents' right to raise their children as they see
fit.100
94. See, e.g., Doninger, 527 F.3d at 44-45 (critiquing administrative action
via a blog that was unaffiliated with the school).
95. See, e.g., Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1089
(W.D. Wash. 2000) (involving tongue-in-cheek mock "obituaries" of student's
friends).
96. See Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1051 (indicating the vast power that school
districts possess).
97. Id.

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. For an opposing viewpoint, see Snyder, 650 F.3d at 934:
The School District's actions in no way forced or prevented J.S.'s parents
from reaching their own disciplinary decision, nor did its actions force
her parents to approve or disapprove of her conduct. Further, there was
no triggering of the parents' liberty interest due to the subject matter of
the School District's involvement; a decision involving a child's use of
social media on the internet is not a "matterf[ of the greatest
importance."
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Like the First Amendment right to free speech, parental
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause to
direct the upbringing of their children free from government
intervention are deeply entrenched in our culture and laws. 0 1 The
Supreme Court first recognized this right in Pierce v. Society of
Sisters,102 where it struck down a state law mandating public
school attendance. 0 3 There, the Court held that the law violated
the parents' Fourteenth Amendment right to direct the upbringing
of their children (e.g., by choosing to send their children to private
school instead).1 04
Since then, the Supreme Court has recognized there is a limit
to this right. For instance, in Prince v. Massachusetts,0 5 the Court
upheld a state law prohibiting a child from selling any type of
literature on public streets or in public places. 0 6 The Court
reasoned that this was within the state's police power to regulate
child labor.107 It also explained that the state has broader power
over children's activities, particularly where the activity
encouraged by the parent is dangerous to the child's well-being. 0 8
More recently, though, the Court has affirmed this parental
right even where harmful results were possible. For instance, the
Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder'09 struck down a state law mandating
school attendance until the age of sixteen because of its influence
on the religious decisions of Amish children and their families.110
Nonetheless, this decision was reached over a dissent, expressing
concern that Amish children may be unable to reach their full
educational potential or autonomy by leaving school at eighth
grade."1 Likewise, in Troxel v. Granville,112 the Court rejected the
application of a non-parental visitation statute permitting
grandparents to request visitation over the dissent's opinion that
the ruling did not adequately protect children from their parents'
arbitrary decisions.113 Thus, in summary, the Supreme Court cases
indicate that parents' decisions trump the states' unless the child's
safety will be threatened and a religious claim may strengthen the
parent's case.
So, how does this right fit in with a school's right to discipline
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
Id. at 534-35.
Id.
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
Id. at 167-70.
Id. at 168.
Id. at 168-69.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Id. at 219.
Id. at 242-43 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2007).
Id. at 86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

2011]

School Disciplineof Cyber-Bullies

103

students for cyber-bullying? The Court in Troxel described this
right as "perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests
recognized by this Court."114 As a fundamental liberty interest, it
can only be interfered with if the state demonstrates a compelling
governmental interest. Perhaps schools may be justified for
disciplining a student for behavior that is within the province of
the parents. But to do so, the school must meet a very high
standard, one that would be particularly high considering schools'
already-limited ability to discipline students for behavior outside
of the school context.
In many cyber-bullying cases where students are disciplined,
school officials investigate and punish the students for using their
parents' computers, in their parents' homes, outside of school
hours. Those in the school community, if they catch wind of the
cyber-bullying, may view this broadcasted behavior and, indeed,
students in the school may be the intended audience. Arguably,
the same can be said for Fraser's lewd speech; one could easily
imagine how members of the school community could have viewed
his speech if he had delivered it in a public forum.
But, another reason the school should not be able to discipline
the student is that this speech-while ultimately ending up in the
public forum-is uttered, in most cases, in the home. The home is
a strongly protected place. Law enforcement may not enter it
without a warrant and a showing of probable cause; likewise, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that a man's home is his
castle.115
It stands to reason then, that if parents have a fundamental
right to direct the upbringing of their children, then the area
where this fundamental right would be most protected should be
in the home. When the school district chooses to punish students
for cyber-bullying that occurs off-campus and that does not cause a
substantial and material disruption of school operations, then the
school usurps the parental authority in the home. One could argue
that this is not usurpation-that both the parents and the school
may effectively punish the child. But it is the fact that the
behavior occurred in the home and did not threaten a substantial
or material disruption that is key here. Where those facts are
present, the school is without authority to discipline and would be
overstepping the bounds of its control if it did.

114. Id. at 65.
115. See, e.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 47 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); Minnesota v. Carter,
525 U.S. 83, 92-93 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring); Georgia v. Randolph, 547
U.S. 103, 115 (2006) (accepting the widely-known maxim that "a man's house
is his castle").
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E. JurisdictionalConcerns
Aside from the constitutional bases for limiting school
authority in the cyber-bullying context, the Fifth Circuit has
espoused that different authorities' responsibilities should be
limited to their own domain.116 Many of the most egregious
instances of cyber-bullying are already punished in the criminal or
civil law realm. For instance, in the Phoebe Prince cyber-bullying
case, the bullies have been indicted on a broad array of criminal
charges: statutory rape, civil rights violations resulting in bodily
injury, criminal harassment, disturbing a school assembly, and
stalking. 117 Likewise, in the Tyler Clementi cyber-bullying case,
the bullies face possible charges of invasion of privacy and
committing a hate crime.118 As one commentator has noted:
It is perfectly appropriate, and perhaps preferable, for schools to
abdicate to the criminal justice system when extremely harmful
online speech violates criminal laws.. . . Threatening violence to
people or their property, coercion, obscene or harassing phone calls
or text messaging, stalking or harassment, sending sexually explicit
photos of a teen, or taking a photo of someone where privacy is
expected, are all acts that may run afoul of the legal system." 9
This is also not to say that school officials may not discipline
students for behavior that actually disrupts school operations or
that contravenes a school rule during the school day. It is simply
reasonable for school officials, not necessarily well-versed in legal
analysis, to turn to law enforcement to solve student problems
outside of their disciplinary authority.
The constitutional protections at stake here are fundamental.
The First Amendment requires a high enough level of protection
for young people's public speech that schools should not be
permitted to discipline for cyber-bullying where it does not
substantially disrupt the school operations. The Fourteenth
Amendment protects a parent's right to direct the upbringing of
his or her children, which appears to be in direct tension with a
school's efforts to discipline a student for at-home behavior.
Sensibly, schools need not stretch their authority to such a degree
when other individuals (parents and law enforcement officers) are
available to exact punishment.

116. Shanley, 462 F.2d at 974.

117. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
118. Bill Hutchinson, Hate Crime May Not Be Option in Suicide of Rutgers
Student Tyler Clementi, NYDAILYNEWS.COM (Oct. 5, 2010, 4:00 PM), http://ww
w.nydailynews.com/nyjocal/2010/10/05/2010-10-05_hate_crimemaynotbe.
option in rutgers._case.html.
119. Backus, supra note 11, at 186.
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IV. THE SUBSTANTIAL DISRUPTION IN FACT TEST

As a result of the constitutional barriers to schools
disciplining students for cyber-bullying, courts should set a higher
standard for permitting school discipline for schools to follow. Most
commentators and courts refer to the Tinker test as "twopronged." 20 Prong one permits schools to discipline students for
speech that causes or is reasonably likely to cause a material and
substantial disruption of school activities. Prong two permits
schools to discipline students for speech that collides with the
rights of other students. Nonetheless, the Tinker test encompasses
three circumstances where a school official can discipline a student
for on-campus speech. These three circumstances are where the
speech: (1) could reasonably be anticipated to cause a substantial
disruption of the school operations; (2) causes a substantial and
material disruption of the school operations; or (3) collides with
121
the rights of other students.
A

SubstantialDisruption in Fact

The collision-with-others'-rights prong has fallen to the
wayside since Tinker and "virtually all the student speech cases
on ... material-andfocused
have
Tinker
applying
22 Although it has been suggested that
substantial[]disruption."l
collision with others' rights may come into more use "in the
context of harassing or demeaning speech," it has yet to be so
widely used, and therefore, will not be considered in this
analysis. 123 Instead, prongs one and two (traditionally just prong
one) will be examined here.
The reason prongs one and two are traditionally considered to
one
prong is that many courts have interpreted the Tinker rule
be
upon which school officials need not wait for a
a
manner
in
to occur before they can act; instead they
disruption
substantial
can act on a well-founded belief that such disruption will occur. 124
120. See, e.g., Emily Gold Waldman, Badmouthing Authority: Hostile Speech
about School Officials and the Limits of School Restrictions, 19 WM. & IVIARY
BILL RTs. J. 591, 596-97 ("The Tinker decision did more than articulate the
two-pronged test that has since been used in countless student speech cases.
Underlying those two prongs was the first major rationale for limiting student
speech rights: protection of other students and/or of the educational
environment as a whole.").
121. See infra Part IV.A-IV.D.
122. Papandrea, supra note 84, at 1042.
123. Id.
124. See Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38-40 (finding disciplinary action
appropriate despite the fact that the expression had not yet reached the level
of a true threat); see also Fraser,478 U.S. at 685 (finding that action in light of
potential undermining of educational mission was adequate reason for school
to act). But see, e.g., Morse, 551 U.S. at 405 (noting that if Fraser's actions had
been done outside of school boundaries, the speech at issue in the Fraser case
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This is
generally
construed
to
mean
that
school
administrators' concerns about what might happen are a sufficient
basis for them to discipline a student.
Nonetheless, in the context of completely off-campus cyberbullying, several cases have shown that courts may be a bit too
quick to defer to the school official due to the public nature of the
Internet. 125 For instance, in J.S., the Third Circuit emphasized
that "due to the technological advances of the Internet, J.S. and
K.L. created a profile that could be, and in fact was, viewed by at
least twenty-two members of the Middle School community within
a matter of days," and then went on to speculate that many
members of the community would have eventually read and been
upset by the content. 126
As the reviewing court held, this conclusion leaves far too
much up to assumptions about how the Internet and its users
operate. Just because something is posted on the Internet does not
mean it will be read by its intended audience, let alone read at all.
Anyone can post a blog or a message on a webpage; in fact, many
do.
If courts are not taken aback by the worldwide qualities of the
web, there is also evidence of another problem-that courts will
find a threat of substantial disruption where none exists. This is
exemplified in Doninger, where the court's bases for upholding the
student's discipline included that her blog used language that was
not "conducive to cooperative conflict resolution" and
"misleading." 127 This is paltry evidence that a substantial
disruption would occur. For instance, the same description could
likely be given to the conversations going on in any bathroom,
locker room, or hallway of America's high schools on any given
day.
The approach proposed in this Article is that the "substantial
disruption in fact" test would permit school discipline for students'
off-campus cyber-bullying only under prong two of the test,
described above. In other words, schools may discipline students
only where the cyber-bullying actually causes a substantial
disruption of school operations. Admittedly, this would result in
very few scenarios in which the school could justifiably discipline
would have been deemed protected).
125. See, e.g., J.S., 593 F.3d at 290 (finding-an opinion later vacated-that
out-of-school speech was subject to substantial disruption standard); J.C., 711
F. Supp. 2d at 1108 (explaining that one of the reasons it was reasonably
foreseeable the YouTube video would reach school was that "[plaintiff posted
her video on the Internet, on a site readily accessible to the general public,"
and noting that "[c]ases considering the relationship between off-campus
speech and the school campus more readily find a sufficient nexus exists
where speech over the Internet is involved.").
126. J.S., 593 F.3d at 291.
127. Doninger, 527 F.3d at 51.
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students for cyber-bullying. Nonetheless, as described below, there
would still be circumstances where schools may use their
disciplinary authority. 128
By removing the forecast-of-disruption option, school
administrators would not be able to discipline students for cyberbullying in instances where there only exists a reasonable belief
that a substantial disruption will result from such behavior. To an
administrator, this option may sound like the equivalent to
waiting for a ticking time bomb to explode, but the truth is that
discipline is not the only option available.
For instance, consider Julia and Mr. Hill's situation. They
should inform the administration of the cyber-bullying behavior;
upon notification, the administration should respond swiftly.
Excellent options at the school's disposal include: holding parent
conferences, mediation, school counseling; obtaining removal of
offensive sites; or holding a meeting with the bullies and local law
enforcement. The school could discipline the bullies who ultimately
refuse to fully cooperate with the intervention efforts. In fact,
piercing the shield of anonymity may be a surprisingly effective
first step in deterring any future bullying behavior. Moreover, the
removal of the forecast option in no way denounces the
administrators' capability in determining when behavior is likely
to cause a substantial disruption of school operations. Rather, such
removal demonstrates that the constitutional concerns at issue are
such that when the speech occurs off-campus in cyberspace, the
threshold must be increased to avoid infringement on those rights.
B. What Is a Substantialand Material Disruption?
The necessary components of what constitutes a substantial
disruption, while not entirely clear, will take shape through a
common-law process. Over time, court decisions have shown that
factors that actually can be shown to disrupt students' abilities to
learn are sufficient. 129 Thus, evidence that a teacher took some

128. Although school codes vary on what off-campus behavior schools can
discipline for, such codes should be brought in conformity with this rule. For
instance, as one commentator has noted, in the state of Georgia alone, the
school codes vary by district. Benjamin T. Bradford, Is it Really Myspace? Our
Disjointed History of Public School Discipline for Student Speech Needs a New
Test for an Online Era, 3 J. MARSHALL L.J. 323, 352 (2010). While some codes
permit punishment for "off-campus activities that have an immediate and
direct effect on discipline in the school or an adverse effect on the safety and
welfare of the students," others "expand school authority to any act by a
student that disrupts the operation of the school system." Id. Under the
proposed test, the former code would be acceptable, while the latter could be
overbroad. Thus, the constitutional concern is avoided if the code states that
there first must be impact in order for the discipline to occur for off-campus
behavior. Id.
129. See, e.g., Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524 (9th Cir.
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sick days from work as a result of the cyber-bullying may not be
sufficient, while his leave of absence from school would be.
Similarly, a student's excessive absences as a result of the bullying
would also likely constitute a substantial disruption. Admittedly,
this presents something of a reverse eggshell plaintiff rule, where
whether the disruption is substantial turns on the toughness of
the victim. However, this is the case because the administration's
overriding interest only kicks in when there is, in fact, this
substantial and material disruption of the school day. Thus, even
if the substantial disruption occurs because the victim is
particularly sensitive to bullying, that is okay; the important point
is that the substantial disruption actually occurs prior to
discipline.
Other instances where a student may be disciplined for cyberbullying would be those involving violent behavior, invasion of
classrooms, or lengthy absence from class.13 0 Moreover, the school
would have to be able to establish that there was "no practical
alternative" to silencing the speech, and that the speech caused
more than just a lack of efficiency.13 1
For instance, in Tinker, the Supreme Court found that the
plaintiffs' black armbands worn to protest the Vietnam War did
not substantially disrupt school operations even though "detailed
testimony by some of [the students] show[ed] their armbands
caused comments, warnings by other students, the poking of fun at
them, and a warning by an older football player that other,
nonprotesting students had better let them alone."132 The
testimony also stated "that a teacher . .. had his lesson period

practically 'wrecked' chiefly by disputes with [one of the
plaintiffs]."133 Nonetheless, the Court determined that there was
"no interference with work and no disorder."134
35
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit, in Blackwell v. Issaquenna,1

held that the plaintiffs' expression substantially disrupted the
school activities where the plaintiffs "conducted themselves in a
disorderly manner [and] disrupted classroom procedure." 136 There,
1992) (wearing buttons to protest aspects of teacher's strike was not
"inherently disruptive" because no actual disruptive factors materialized from
the students' actions).
130. See, e.g., Gillman ex rel. Gillman v. Sch. Bd. for Holmes Co., Fla., 567 F.
Supp. 2d 1359, 1373 (N.D. Fla. 2008) (stating that a school board can neither
discipline students nor encroach upon freedom of speech rights based on
predictions that behavior, which a school board disagrees with, will evolve into
material and substantial classroom disruption).
131. Butts v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 436 F.2d 728, 730, 732 (5th Cir. 1971).
132. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 517 (Black, J., dissenting).
133. Id. (Black, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 514.
135. Blackwell v. Issaquenna Co. Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
136. See id. at 753 (demonstrating an example of material and substantial
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the court found it relevant that a student involved "came
into ... class[ without permission, and ignor[ed] . . . the classroom

procedure." 137
Although these cases show that there would be a high
threshold to determine that a substantial disruption of school
operations occurred, this threshold would be accompanied by
significant deference to the schools' decisions. For example, the
Supreme Court explained that it has "repeatedly emphasized the
need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and
of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional
safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools."138
C. Cases Where the SubstantialDisruption in Fact Test
Would Not Be Met
The following cases serve as useful illustrations of where
cyber-bullying would not meet the substantial disruption in fact
test. In J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified School District,
J.C. created a YouTube video viewed by an estimated fifteen
people that contained disparaging remarks about a student. 139 The
victim-student missed less than one class to talk with a school
counselor about her hurt feelings. 140 There was no evidence the
video was viewed on campus by students. 14 1 The court held that it
was reasonably foreseeable the bully's video "would make its way
to campus" for the following reasons: (1) it was posted on the
Internet; (2) it was posted on a weeknight; (3) the bully told five to
ten students to watch it; (4) the bully told the victim to watch it;
and (5) the video was derogatory.142 These are attenuated
connections to school operations, and as the court noted, the only
access of the video at school was by the administration during its

disruption by the Supreme Court in Tinker).
137. Id. at 752.
138. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507. See also Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 ("[T]he
education of the Nation's youth is primarily the responsibility of parents,
teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of federal judges.");
Morse, 551 U.S. at 410 (recognizing that the principal had to make an "on the
spot" decision about whether to do something about the banner). In
concurrence, Justice Breyer also explained that school officials are entitled to
qualified immunity for this very reason, and noted that such individuals are
not expected to "fully understand the intricacies of our First Amendment
jurisprudence." Id. at 427; New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.9 (1985)
("Absent any suggestion that the [school] rule violates some substantive
constitutional guarantee, the courts should, as a general matter, defer to that
judgment and refrain from attempting to distinguish between rules that are
important to the preservation of order in the schools and rules that are not.").
139. J.C., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1098.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1099.
142. Id. at 1108.
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investigation. 143 Even if it was reasonably foreseeable that the
video would make its way to campus, the court did not determine
that it was reasonably foreseeable that the video would cause a
substantial disruption of school operations-which is the actual
standard of the Tinker test. Moreover, the evidence showed
conclusively that the video did not in fact cause a substantial
disruption. Under the test proposed, absence from part of one class
and fleeting hurt feelings of one student would not be a sufficient
basis for finding that a substantial disruption had transpired, and
therefore, the school would not have authority to discipline in this
type of scenario.
Doninger v. Niehoff is also an example where the substantial
disruption in fact test would not be satisfied. 144 There, the student
posted a blog message that referred to school administrators as
"douchebags" for repeatedly rescheduling a school musical festival,
and encouraged others to contact the school superintendent to
"piss her off more." 145 The court held that it was reasonably
foreseeable that the blog post would reach school property because:
(1) it directly pertained to school events; (2) it encouraged fellow
students to read and respond; and (3) the posting managed to
reach school administrators. 146
The court also held that the blog was reasonably foreseeable
to cause a substantial disruption because: (1) it contained offensive
language; (2) it included misleading information that the festival
had been cancelled; and (3) a sit-in was threatened as a result of
students' believing the event had been cancelled. 147 Here, as in the
previously discussed case, the court must draw attenuated
conclusions in order to establish the appropriate nexus between
the speech and school operations. The most compelling evidence of
a threat of substantial disruption was the threatened sit-in, but
there was no evidence that any administrators or faculty were
even aware of this until after the threat no longer existed. 148 Mere
offensive language and misleading factual information on a
personal blog should not even be sufficient to establish that a
substantial disruption was forecasted. Therefore, it is also
insufficient for establishing that a substantial disruption actually
occurred.
A third example of substantial disruption not actually
realized is Beussink v. Woodland R-JV School District.149 There,
143. Id.
144. Doninger,527 F.3d at 41.
145. Id. at 45.
146. Id. at 50.
147. Id. at 50-53.
148. Id.
149. Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D. Mo.
1998).

School Disciplineof Cyber-Bullies

2011]

111

the student created a website criticizing his high school's
administration.1 50 The webpage used vulgar language and "invited
readers to contact the school principal and communicate their
opinions [to him] ... ."151 It even included a hyperlink to the
school's homepage.152 The student showed the webpage to a friend,
who then showed it to a teacher at school.153 There was evidence
that a few students viewed the webpage at school, and that the
principal heard students discussing the incident in the halls. 154
Again, a few views of the webpage and some discussion in the halls
is not enough for a substantial disruption to occur in light of the
high threshold it requires.
Finally, consider Emmett v. Kent School District No. 415,155
where Emmett had created a web page from his home, titled the
"Unofficial Kentlake High Home Page."156 Aside from statements
disclaiming any school sponsorship and asserting that the page
was for entertainment purposes only, the site included mock
obituaries of two of Emmett's friends that were "written tongue-incheek." 15 7 It also had an area where visitors could vote on "who
would be the subject of the next mock obituary."15 8 The day after a
nighttime television newscast characterized the site as a "hit list,"
the school principal issued Emmett an emergency expulsion.159
There, the court concluded that the speech was not within the
purview of the school's disciplinary authority because it occurred
outside of the school and was not school-sponsored or connected
with a school project.1so The court also emphasized that because

there

was

"no

evidence

that

the

mock

obituaries

and

voting . .. manifested any violent tendencies whatsoever," the

school's special concerns about student violence in school were not
at issue either.161

This type of cyber-speech represents what could be very
concerning to school officials. Clearly there was no substantial
disruption so the school could not act. The immediate threat of
violence by a student to other students is another issue altogether,
and outside of the scope of this Note. While it was not present in
this case, since the obituaries were "tongue-in-cheek," and inspired
by a creative writing course, if actual violence is threatened
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 1177.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1177-78.
Id. at 1177-81.
Emmett, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088.
Id. at 1089.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1090.
Id.
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against students or school authorities, the school should certainly
be given more leeway to respond appropriately to deal with such
threats.
In sum, brief absences from school, threatened behavior that
teachers are unaware of until after the fact, hurt feelings,
offensive language, and content targeted at members of the school
community are factors that alone are not sufficient to constitute a
substantial and material disruption of school operations. Further,
all of those factors together would not likely constitute a
substantial enough disruption. Rather, in order for this test to be
satisfied, there would need to be more. What exactly constitutes
more would have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
Certainly, excessive absence from school, violent behavior, or
behavior that severely disrupts several class sessions would be
examples of where the high threshold is met.
D. Cases Where the SubstantialDisruptionin Fact Test
Would Be Met
Few cases that address disciplinary actions for cyber-bullying
have involved substantial disruption actually occurring at the
schools. This is largely due to the fact that "digital
communications do not intrude into the public space, and therefore
by their very nature cannot cause an immediate disruption to the
work of the school."1 62 Nonetheless, where substantial disruption
has actually occurred, either in the case of a collision with the
rights of other students, or in the likely more common case of
excessive absences from school, the school can act if the reaction is
shown to be caused by the cyber-bullying. Likewise, excessive
absences of a teacher-victim may also cause a substantial
disruption of school operations.
For instance, in J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area School
District, J.S., a student, created a website that, among other
things, included a picture of his teacher, Mrs. Fulmer, that showed
"her severed head dripping with blood ... [and] her face morphing
into Adolph Hitler."163 The image was also accompanied by "a
solicitation .. . for funds to cover the cost of a hit man."164 As a
result of physical and emotional injury from viewing this image,
Mrs. Fulmer did not finish out the school year and took a medical
leave of absence for the following year. 6 5 Because of these
absences, the school had to employ numerous substitute teachers
to temporarily teach in her stead.166 The facts also indicated that
162. Papandrea, supra note 84, at 1093.
163. J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d 412, 421 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2000).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 417.
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the website "had a demoralizing impact on the school
community."16 7
This is clearly a case where the cyber-bullying has caused a
substantial disruption of school operations. The students in Mrs.
Fulmer's classroom were not receiving the quality instruction they
would have received if she had not taken the leave of absence in
response to the students' violent posting. Similarly, where the
bullying actually spills over into the school day and causes a
substantial disruption, the school may immediately discipline the
students for that behavior. As explained in more detail below, this
type of ceaseless bullying may be best dealt with through
alternative methods of conflict resolution in addition to traditional
school punishments.
V.

PRACTICAL APPLICATION AND ALTERNATIVES

One of the greatest difficulties that both courts and school
administrators would face with this type of threshold for
disciplining students would be their strong inclination to discipline
cyber-bullies. This is an understandable reaction. School officials
may feel the pressure from their communities to act swiftly and
perhaps even in a draconian fashion in light of the highlypublicized instances of cyber-bullying. They may also feel insulted
and tempted to extend their authority to the at-home behavior of
students whose behaviors reach their attention. Nonetheless, the
school is not without recourse.
Let us return to Julia and Mr. Hill. Remember that Julia is
separately being bullied at both school and in cyberspace;
furthermore, Mr. Hill believes he is being cyber-bullied. In Julia's
case, the bullying that has occurred at school can be documented
and disciplined because this is on-campus behavior that falls
squarely within the scope of Tinker.
But, for both of their cyber-bullying situations, there has been
no substantial disruption of school operations. Julia is still
attending school, and still getting high grades while Mr. Hill has
not been able to access the posts written about him. Rather than
immediately disciplining the bullies for their harmful behavior,
Mr. Hill has several other options. For example, he may report the
behavior to the bullies' parents or schedule a parent-teacher
conference with them. Depending on the content of the cyberbullying, Mr. Hill and Julia can explore their rights as private
citizens under criminal or civil laws against the bullies for their
conduct. As mentioned above, the school can also discipline the
bullies if they refuse to comply with intervention procedures.
Moreover, Mr. Hill and Julia can contact Facebook to report the

167. Id.
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imposter profile.168
Moreover, there are a number of different and possibly more
effective and appropriate avenues than discipline available for
remedying the problems that cyber-bullies pose.169 For instance,
disciplining the bullies is not necessarily protective of the victim.
One reason is that school discipline affects the student's behavior
at the school, but cyber-bullying is not even occurring at the
school. Moreover, commentators have recognized that there is no
evidence that such discipline would eliminate the behavior,170 and
many students have agreed.
One study found that "many students thought that
suspension or direct punitive consequences [we]re not sustainable
solutions to cyberbullying."171 That same study noted that
students "preferred mediation and felt that they have the ability to
work through these issues if given a safe environment." 172 Some
other options available to schools include Internet safety training
programs; teacher, parental, or peer-to-peer mediation; legal
action when necessary; and partnerships with cellular and social
networking industries to promote safe behavior. Schools may also
look into implementing diversions or alternative programs to
provide students with productive activities to partake in after
school. Likewise, the school could create and implement parental
training programs, which can be done by partnering with the local
police departments.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Cyber-bullying victims do not have to suffer in silence.
Schools can offer these students many outlets to help them with
cyber-bullying issues and can let all of their students know about
the extremely harmful effects that such behavior can have on
everyone involved. Yet, where cyber-bullying occurs off-campus
168. Susan Arnout Smith, The Fake Facebook Profile I Could Not Get
Removed, SALON.COM (Feb. 1, 2011, 7:39 PM), http://www.salon.com/life
/feature/2011/02/01/myfakefacebook-profile. Both Facebook and Myspace
have links in the help sections of their websites to facilitate the reporting of
impostor profiles. Id. Unfortunately, as at least one victim, Susan Arnout
Smith, has recounted, the road to getting Facebook to remove a profile can be
a long one. Id. One month after filing a report with Facebook, Smith had not
received a response. Id. But, after contacting the school principals of the
bullies (from a school outside of the U.S.), the principals were able to get the
Facebook page removed in a very short time. Id.
169. See Madigan, supra note 6, at 8-9 (providing various alternatives to
discipline, including but not limited to: educating children about cyberbullying, getting parents more involved in educational programs, and
implementing anonymous and confidential reporting systems).
170. See Backus, supra note 11, at 186 (explaining commentators analyses of
disciplining cyber-bullies).
171. Madigan, supra note 6, at 4.
172. Id.
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and does not actually cause a substantial disruption of school
operations, this behavior should fall outside of the school's
disciplinary authority. The First Amendment demands it. The
Fourteenth Amendment demands it. There are others who are
better suited to handle the more egregious cases.
Moreover, where there are seriously harmful issues such as
cyber-bullying facing our nation's students, school discipline will
not definitively solve the problem. This is not to say that there is
no place for punishment in school. Having school discipline in
place no doubt deters most students from disobeying the rules.
Nonetheless, this harmful and antisocial behavior may best
be addressed by eliminating the shroud of anonymity that many
cyber-bullies believe they are covered in. Where administrators or
students know who the bullies are, or are able to find them out,
then, the school should initiate all remedial efforts they can to
expose the bullies for who they are and what they have been doing.
It is perhaps only through these remedial efforts that the true root
of the problem can be determined and remedied.
At the same time, by restricting schools to prevention and
mediation efforts in this area, students are able to take the
expressive risks that the First Amendment permits in the public
forum, and at the same time respect their parents' rights to choose
whether to teach their children appropriate in-home behavior.

